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Diversity Jurisdiction and Alien Corporations: The
Application of Section 1332(c)
Prior to 1958, both domestic and foreign corporations were considered
citizens only of the state of their incorporation for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. In 1958 Congress enacted title 28 U.S.C. section 1332(c) to reduce
the case load of the federal courts and to rectify abuses of diversity
jurisdiction.' Section 1332(c) provides that for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion, a corporation is a citizen of both the state of its incorporation and the
state where it has its principal place of business.' While this dual citizenship
creates no problems when domestic corporations are involved, the applica-
tion of section 1332(c) to alien corporations 3 has been inconsistently applied
1. See, e.g., Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882) (corporation chartered
in a foreign country deemed a citizen of that country); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57
U.S. (16 How.) 314, 325-29 (1853) (corporation chartered in an American state deemed a citizen
of that state).
2. The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) reads:
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens
of a state or of different states.
(b) Except when express provision therefore is otherwise made in a statute of the
United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally in the Federal courts
is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or value of $10,000,
computed without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant
may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district
court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the
plaintiff.
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of
the State where it has its principal place of business: Provided further, That in
any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined
as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which
the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has been incor-
porated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.
(d) The word "States," as used in this section, includes Territories, the District
of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
3. This Note will deal solely with corporations chartered in a foreign country. Such cor-
porations will be referred to as "alien" or "foreign" corporations. They are not to be confused
with corporations incorporated in another state of the United States which are often referred
to as foreign corporations when discussing diversity jurisdiction.
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by the courts.'
Congress failed to consider the question of how section 1332(c) was to be
applied to foreign corporations,' particularly when the corporation's principal
place of business was located in the United States. As a result, section 1332(c)
has been interpreted in contradictory ways: sometimes creating diversity
jurisdiction for alien corporations when it would not otherwise be present6
and at other times destroying it when it would have been available7 but for
subsection (c). Numerous solutions have been proposed by the courts and
commentators to deal with the problem of alien corporations.,
Furthermore, this Note addresses the issue of citizenship for alien corporations which are in-
corporated in a foreign county but have their principal place of business in the United States.
It should be recognized that a corporation incorporated in the United States with its principal
place of business in a foreign country must deal with many of the same problems and issues
under section 1332(c). See I J. MOORE, J. LucAs, H. FINK, D. WEcKSTEiN & J. WIcKR, MooRE's
FEDEAL PRACTCE 0.77[2.-3] (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
4. See infra text accompanying notes 25-78.
5. Congress did not consider the application of section 1332(c) to foreign-chartered cor-
porations. The legislative history, therefore, is of limited help in ascertaining the appropriate
interpretation of the statute. See S. RP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3099, 3101-02 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. See, e.g.,
Chemical Transp. Corp. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1964):
"No explicit consideration was given by Congress to the effect of the amendment upon alien
corporations." Id. at 566.
6. This situation occurs when a corporation chartered in a foreign state with its principal
place of business in a state of the United States is able to sue or be sued by an alien. Diversity
jurisdiction applies because the alien corporation under section 1332(a)(2) is deemed to be a citizen
of a state of the United States. If section 1332(c) does not apply to the corporation, no diversity
jurisdiction exists because the corporation is not a citizen of a state of the United States and
it would not be deemed an alien citizen; the presence of aliens on both sides of a controversy
will serve to defeat diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
303 (1809); Merchants' Cotton Press and Storage Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 151 U.S.
368, 385-87 (1894).
7. Diversity jurisdiction would be destroyed where an alien corporation with its principal
place of business in state A is sued by or sues a citizen of state A. If section 1332(c) is applied
to this corporation there would not be diversity jurisdiction as it would not be a controversy
between citizens of different states as required under section 1332(a). However, if 1332(c) is not
applied, the corporation would be a foreign citizen and there would be diversity jurisdiction
under 1332(a)(2).
8. Two solutions are generally promulgated by the courts and commentators. The first
is to retain the traditional rule and interpret section 1332(c) as inapplicable to alien corporations. See
infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text; 13B C. WIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3628 (1984) [hereinafter cited as WRcr & MnI.ER]. A second
approach is to apply section 1332(c) to alien corporations, deeming the corporation to be a citizen
of the state where it has its principal place of business as well as its foreign country of its incor-
poration. Id.; See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
At least one court has suggested there is a third alternative, that is to deem an alien corpora-
tion to be a citizen of the place where it maintains its principal place of business. See Salomon
Englander y CIA, LTDA v. Israel Discount Bank Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 914, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); see also Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction: The Dilemma of Dual Citizenship and Alien
Corporations, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 565 (1982). The author of this Comment concludes that "[a]
clear and simple approach to determine the alien corporation's citizenship for diversity purposes
would be to base citizenship solely on the location of the corporation's principal place of business."
Id. at 587. This interpretation does have some merit; however, it disregards the language of
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This Note will discuss section 1332(c) and the underlying goals of that
statute.9 The various interpretations taken by the courts will be analyzed in
order to demonstrate the inconsistencies that result from these approaches.
Attention will be given to the constitutionality of expanding federal jurisdic-
tion to alien corporations seeking judicial recognition of their "dual citizen-
ship." This Note concludes that section 1332(c) should be narrowly applied
only in those situations where the result is to limit diversity jurisdiction, a
situation that may occur only when an American citizen is one of the parties
to the controversy.
I. Tim STATUTE
The issue of the "proper extent of the federal judicature"10 first confronted
the statute which states that a corporation is a citizen of the "State" where its principal place
of business is located and of its "State" of incorporation. The question of whether "State"
with a capital "S" can apply to an alien chartered corporation remains a concern. It does seem
unreasonable, however, not to recognize the alien charter of a corporation in any way, especially
when the corporation may be owned by a foreign government or foreign citizens. This also ignores
the constitutional problem that can arise when two alien chartered and owned corporations are
able to take advantage of American federal courts. See infra text accompanying notes 70-83.
A fourth issue which should be addressed is whether section 1332(c), if it applies to an alien
corporation, should apply to the corporation's worldwide principal place of business or simply
its principal place of business within the United States. See MooRE, supra note 3, 0.75[3].
If the second alternative is used a corporation which does very little business in the United States
may still find itself a citizen of a state of the United States by virtue of the state being the
corporation's principal place of business in the United States. Professor Moore argues that if
section 1332(c) applies to alien corporations it should apply to their principal place of business
in the United States even if it is not their worldwide principal place of business. He states that
"to hold otherwise would ignore the corporation's impact in the United States, an effect which
seems most relevant to determining the extent of jurisdiction of the federal courts in this coun-
try." Id.
Such an interpretation does not seem reasonable when one considers the rule applied to domestic
'corporations. A domestic corporation can have only one principal place of business even though
there are many situations when a corporation's impact in another state is significant. See, e.g.,
WRIGHr & MILLER, supra. Moreover, this interpretation is potentially unfair to certain foreign
corporations. Diversity jurisdiction could be denied where an alien corporation's contact with
a state is so slight that it becomes unfair to deem the corporation a citizen of the state. Therefore,
it seems that the correct rule, should section 1332(c) apply to alien corporations, would be to
deem an alien corporation a citizen of a state in the United States only if the state is the worldwide
principal place of business. See R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 614,
616 (N.D. I11. 1981); Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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It should be pointed out that the majority of cases do not make such a distinction when con-
sidering section 1332(c) nor do they identify whether they are dealing with a corporation's worldwide
principal place of business or simply its principal place of business within the United States.
Unless it is noted otherwise, the reader should assume that when this Note uses "principal place
of business" in the text, that it refers to the worldwide principal place of business of the cor-
poration. Additionally, whenever a hypothetical is set out in the text or footnotes, "state" will
always refer to a state in the United States. A foreign state will be referred to as a "foreign state."
9. See Comment, supra note 8, at 568-77; Note, Alien Corporations and Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 84 CoLUm. L. REv. 177, 178-79 (1984).
10. The term was coined by Alexander Hamilton. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 494 (H.
Lodge ed. 1888).
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the drafters of the Constitution. Concerns were voiced that citizens of dif-
ferent states or nations might suffer prejudice at the hands of state courts."
The framers responded to these fears by adopting section 2, clause 1 of arti-
cle III. This section empowers Congress to create jurisdiction for cases in-
volving a controversy between citizens of different states or between a citizen
of a state and that of a foreign state."2
Congress exercised its article III powers in attempting to limit the federal
judiciary's diversity jurisdiction with the passage of section 1332(c) of title
28.'1 Under this amendment, a corporation is considered to be a citizen of
both the state in which it is incorporated as well as of the state where its
principal place of business is located. Prior to its enactment, a domestic cor-
poration was considered to be a citizen solely of its state of incorporation."'
An alien corporation was deemed to be a citizen of the foreign state in which
it was chartered.'"
The primary purpose of the drafters of section 1332(c) was to ease the
workload of the federal courts. 6 Another purpose for creating diversity
jurisdiction was to provide a safe federal forum for out-of-state citizens against
the possible prejudices of local state courts and juries.'7 Despite the spate
of criticism directed at diversity jurisdiction in recent years, 8 this latter pur-
pose remains the rationale upon which it survives. ' Section 1332(c) was enacted
to protect against the potential prejudices of state courts as well as to prevent
corporations from "forum shopping."20
11. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAiv. L. REv. 483 (1928).
The contention was that a state court would treat alien commercial interests unfairly. Madison
said, "It may happen that a strong prejudice may arise in some states, against the citizens of
others, who may have strong claims against them." Id. at 493. Madison also feared that unless
the fears of foreign commercial interests were assuaged, the economy of the United States would
suffer: "We ... know ... that foreigners cannot get justice done them in [state] courts, and
this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us." James Madison,
reprinted in 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION'
oF TE FEDERAL CONsTiuToN AS RECOMNENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN PHILADELPMA
IN 1787 528 (1836). Judge Friendly argues that the delegates' primary fear was the possibility
of prejudice from the hands of the state legislatures. Friendly, supra, at 495.
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982).
14. See supra note 1.
15. Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1897); National S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S.
118 (1882).
16. See S. REP., supra note 5, at 3100.
17. Elliot, supra note 11, at 528.
18. A number of commentators have urged the abolition of diversity jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1332(a)(l)-suits between "citizens of different States." See H. FRmNDLY, FEDERAL. JuRIsDIC-
TION: A GENERAL Vmw 139-52 (1973); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law In-
stitute (pt. 1), 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1968); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive
Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HARv. L. REv. 963 (1979).
19. See Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
"[I]t was not the purpose of the amendment to abandon the protection from local prejudice
against outsiders as the reason for diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 502.
20. The most famous example of forum shopping occurred in Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1927).
[Voi.59:659
ALIEN CORPORA TIONS
Prior to the passage of the amendment, a local corporation could bring
suit in federal court against another local corporation by dissolving itself and
reincorporating in another state.2" Section 1332(c) was never intended to extend
to a local corporation which, because of a legal fiction, is considered a citizen
of another state."
The question of whether diversity jurisdiction could be properly invoked
in a suit where one of the parties is an alien citizen operating in the United
States was never addressed in the legislative history of section 1332(c). 3 Con-
gress also failed to consider the resultant problem of an alien citizen asserting
dual citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The issue, consequent-
ly, has been left to the courts2" which have been unable to concur on the
proper application of section 1332(c) to an alien corporation, particularly when
the corporation's principal place of business is located in the United States.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE
A. Suits Between a Citizen of State A and an Alien Corporation
Whose Principal Place of Business is in State A: Section 1332(c) Does
Not Apply
The issue of whether section 1332(c) is applicable to alien corporations was
first addressed in Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. 2 The plain-
tiff, a citizen of New York, brought suit in federal district court against a
British corporation whose principal place of business in America was located
in New York. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdic-
tion, claiming that it should be considered to be a citizen of New York since
its principal place of business was located there.
The court relied on a very literal interpretation of the statutory language
in rejecting this argument. Section 1332(c), in the opinion of the court, does
not invest dual citizenship in alien corporations. It reasoned that Congress
21. Id.
22. The legal fiction issue arose because of problems that developed prior to the 1958 amend-
ment. For example, in 1928 a Kentucky corporation dissolved itself in Kentucky and reincor-
porated in Tennessee so that it could bring suit in federal court, against a local competitor,
also a Kentucky corporation. Id. Congress cited this case in the Senate report to section 1332(c).
S. REP., supra note 5, at 3102.
23. See supra note 5.
24. See, e.g., Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981); R.W. Sawant
& Co. v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 614 (N.D. Il. 1981); Salomon Englander y CIA,
LTDA v. Israel Discount Bank, Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hercules, Inc. v. Dynamic
Export Corp., 71 F.R.D. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jerro v. Home Lines, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman and Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001
(N.D. Ill. 1973); Tsakontis v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Chemical Transp. Corp. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
25. 189 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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intended to distinguish between businesses incorporated in one of the several
states and those holding a foreign charter.
It is to be noted that the statute differentiates between States of the United
States and foreign states by the use of a capital S for the word when ap-
plied to a State of the United States. Subdivision (c), therefore, in dealing
with the place of incorporation refers only to a corporation incorporated
in a State of the United States. When subdivision (c) goes on to deal with
principalplace of business it refers to the same corporation and thus only
to a corporation incorporated in a State of the United States. The sub-
division is not susceptible of the construction as if it read "all corpora-
tions shall be deemed citizens of the States by which they have their prin-
cipal place of business." Unless a corporation is incorporated by a State
of the United States it will not be deemed a citizen of the State where
it has its principal place of business.2 6
Even if section 1332(c) could be interpreted as extending citizenship to alien
corporations whose principal place of business was in the United States, the
defendant's claims would have been rejected. A corporation, in the view of
the Eisenberg court, cannot maintain a principal place of business in Europe
and a separate principal place of business in another country. 7
The reasoning in Eisenberg was relied upon four years later in Chemical
Transportation Corp. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp.28 The plaintiff, in-
corporated under the laws of Liberia and claiming to maintain its principal
place of business in New York, brought suit against a corporation organized
under the laws of New York. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that no diversity of citizenship existed between the parties.
The Chemical Transportation court took the Eisenberg decision one step
further in denying the defendant's motion, basing its analysis on the congres-
sional intent behind section 1332(c).2 9 The defendant argued that the Eisenberg
analysis was mistaken in its reasoning that Congress had intended to distinguish
between foreign "states" and "States" of the United States. 30 The defendant
reasoned that the word "States" was intended to apply to both foreign states
and states of the United States, but that the drafters "necessarily could use
only one form of the word or the other, not both . . .,31
The court rejected this argument because it failed to find any congressional
intent to support the defendant's contention. The Chemical Transportation
court argued that Congress was aware that it had previously utilized different
meanings for the words "States" and "states" in section 1332(a). Had Con-
26. Id. at 502 (emphasis in original).
27. The legislative history states that a corporation's principal place of business shall be
determined under similar tests in the Bankruptcy Act. S. RE., supra note 5, at 3102. See generally
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 3625 (determining a corporation's principal place of business).
28. 246 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
29. Id. at 566.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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gress wanted section 1332(c) to apply to alien corporations, it could have pro-
vided that a corporation be considered a citizen of the "State or foreign state"
in which it was incorporated or had its principal place of business. 32
The court reasoned that the determination of whether a statute should apply
to alien corporations should be left to Congress. It noted that:
Congress, for example, might wish to determine whether diversity jurisdic-
tion should be withdrawn from alien corporations which might not have
standing to institute suits in State courts; whether applicability of § 1332(c)
to alien corporations would have a negative effect on foreign trade or
commerce; or whether the alien corporation should retain a status similar
to the alien individual who may invoke diversity jurisdiction despite pro-
longed residence in the State of which his adversary is a citizen."
The court concluded that the wording of the statute and the absence of con-
gressional consideration and guiding policy compelled it to hold that section
1332(c) does not apply to alien corporations. 34
B. Suits Between a Citizen of State A and an Alien Corporation
Whose Principal Place of Business is in State A: Section 1332(c)
Does Apply
The conferral of state citizenship upon an alien corporation was recognized
by a federal court in Southeast Guaranty Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw,
Inc.3" The two parties in the controversy were a corporation chartered in the
Bahamas and a corporate citizen of Illinois; the defendant asserted that no
diversity jurisdiction existed because the Bahamian corporation maintained
its principal place of business in Illinois. 36 The court held that section 1332(c)
applies to alien corporations that have their principal place of business in
the United States.17
Under the Eisenberg analysis, an alien corporation is considered to be a
citizen solely in the state of its foreign incorporation. An alien corporation,
under this analysis, would always be diverse to citizens of a state regardless
of the length of time that it conducted business enterprises in the same locale.
The Southeast court expressly rejected the literal interpretation of the language
of section 1332(c) relied upon is Eisenberg. The court reasoned that the
Eisenberg analysis is appropriate when it is applied to the first part of section
1332(c) (regarding state of incorporation), but it errs when it is applied to
the principal place of business clause. 38 When a corporation has its principal
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
36. Id. at 1005. Diversity would be lacking because both plaintiff and defendant would
be deemed to be citizens of Illinois under section 1332(c).
37. Id. at 1006-07.
38. Id.
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place of business in the same state as its charter, the second half of section
1332(c) is inapplicable. The court said:
Since it makes no sense at all for a corporation to be twice a citizen of
the same state there must be read in at the end of the section, "if the
State of its principal place of business is different from the State of its
incorporation." Similarly, we see no grounds for concluding that because
the first half of the section does not apply to foreign corporations, that
the second half should have no applicability to them at all. It seems no
greater extension of the language to read in, when dealing with foreign
corporations, "if its principal place of business is in the United States."
Obviously Congress would only use the word state with a capital S, since
if a corporation's principal place of business was in a foreign state it would
have no effect whatsoever on its citizenship for diversity purposes in the
courts of the United States.39
It rejected the argument that congressional silence on the issue should be
interpreted as applying section 1332(c) only to domestic corporations."' The
underlying purpose of section 1332(c)-to limit diversity jurisdiction-formed
the basis of the Southeast court's analysis. This purpose is achieved when
section 1332(c) is interpreted as applying to an alien corporation"' that operates
its principal place of business in the United States. This interpretation eliminates
all technical findings of diversity when diversity does not actually exist."2
The Southeast court's application of section 1332(c) to alien corporations
was approved by other courts of appeals decisions. 3 In Jerguson v. Blue Dot
Investment, Inc.,44 a Fifth Circuit decision, a Florida plaintiff brought suit
against a Panamanian corporation. The diversity issue arose because the
Panamanian corporation located its principal place of business in Florida.
If section 1332(c) applied to the corporation, diversity would be lacking under
section 1332(a)(1), which requires that the parties be citizens of different states.
In affirming a dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit
relied on an analysis similar to that used in the Southeast case."'
The court interpreted the reference in section 1332(c) to state of incorpora-
tion as limited to state corporations; its focus on principal place of business,
however, could not be similarly interpreted. The court reasoned:
39. Id. at 1007.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981). The Second Circuit
briefly addressed this issue in dictum in Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1979),
where a Canadian trustee brought suit to gain access to a bankrupt Canadian corporation's New
York office. The issue of diversity jurisdiction was raised sua sponte; the Clarkson court by
footnote stated that as an alien corporation, organized under the laws of Canada, the bankrupt
corporation was probably a citizen exclusively of Canada for purposes of diversity. Id. at 628 n.5.
44. 659 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. The similarity exists in the fact that both courts argued that congressional silence does
not necessarily imply that section 1332(c) cannot apply to alien corporations.
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Reading the word "State" to refer only to an American state, however,
does not necessitate the conclusion that the principal place of business
part of section 1332(c) cannot be applied to alien corporations. We disagree
with the analysis in Eisenberg that since the first part of section 1332(c)
dealing with the place of incorporation necessarily applies only to a business
incorporated in the United States, the second part of section 1332(c) deal-
ing with the principal place of business must also be limited to domestic
corporations."
The opinion further argued that the statute itself fails to provide adequate
guidance in that there is no evidence that it is applicable solely to domestic
corporations. 7 The court recognized that the statute can be, and indeed has
been, interpreted in conflicting ways. 8 Since Congress apparently did not con-
sider the question of alien corporations and diversity jurisdiction, the court
noted that "it cannot be inferred from Congress' silence that Congress intended
the statute to be construed one way or the other." 9
Section 1332(c) was enacted in order to limit diversity jurisdiction to those
out-of-state citizens who might suffer from the results of local prejudices."0
To apply section 1332(c) to alien corporations whose principal place of business
is located in the same state as the domicile of the other party to the suit would
best effectuate the congressional purpose. 5'
The application of section 1332(c) to alien corporations in limited circum-
stances is appropriate. It results in the limitation of diversity jurisdiction
because it eliminates the legal fiction that the alien corporation is solely a
citizen of its place of legal incorporation. A company whose principal business
operations are located in a given state is unlikely to suffer prejudice from
the local judicial system.5 2 The conferral of state citizenship upon the alien
corporation results in treating it in the same manner, for instance, as a
Delaware corporation with it principal place of business in that state.53
C. Suits Between Alien Corporations
No diversity jurisdiction exists when a suit is brought by an alien corpora-
tion against a second alien corporation. At the same time, section 1332(c)
46. Jerguson, 659 F.2d at 35.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See S. Rap., supra note 5, at 3102.
51. Jerguson, 659 F.2d at 35.
52. "It is a fair inference that a corporation which has located its principal place of business
in a State has adopted that State as its actual residence and will not be subject to prejudice
against outsiders." Eisenberg, 189 F. Supp. at 502.
53. Id. The recent trend among the courts, especially outside the Southern District of New
York, has been to apply section 1332(c) to alien corporations. See, e.g., Trans World Hosp.
Supplies Ltd. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 542 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Arab Int'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. National Westminister Bank Ltd., 463 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Southeast
Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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provides that a corporation is considered a citizen of the state in which it
maintains its principal place of business. When an alien corporation operating
principally in the United States is involved in a suit against another alien cor-
poration, the question arises whether section 1332(c) should be interpreted
to permit a suit involving alien corporations to be brought in federal court.
Two fundamental purposes of section 1332(c), as discussed previously, are
to reduce the federal courts' workload and to prevent local corporations from
artificially creating diversity by incorporating in a separate state." Applying
section 1332(c) to alien corporations potentially places the primary purposes
of the section in conflict.
Section 1332(c) has been inconsistently applied to alien corporations. This
inconsistency has resulted in the creation of diversity jurisdiction in situations
where diversity would not normally be recognized. It has also denied standing
to a foreign-chartered corporation in some instances despite the corporation's
assertions that its principal place of business is located in the United States.
A literal interpretation of section 1332(c), such as that employed by the
Eisenberg court, may appear the most reasonable one. At the same time,
however, this approach fails because it creates diversity jurisdiction in situa-
tions that in actuality involve citizens of the same state when one of the par-
ties is legally chartered in a foreign country." A corporation, domiciled in
state A, may claim diversity jurisdiction as an alien corporation because it
is incorporated in another country-clearly the type of scenario that section
1332(c) was designed to prevent. The result is the expansion of diversity
jurisdiction." This may further result in a possible advantage to the foreign
corporation to the detriment of the domestic entity. 7
The most recent case on this issue was decided in the Middle District of Tennessee. In Trans
World Hosp. Supplies Ltd. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 542 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1982),
the defendant was an American corporation, the plaintiff a British corporation. The controversy
over section 1332(c) arose because the plaintiff wanted to join Hospital Corporation of America
Service Supply Co. (HCAS&S) as an additional defendant. Id. at 870. HCAS&S was chartered
under the laws of the Cayman Islands. However, HCAS&S was a subsidiary of the defendant,
Hospital Corporation of America, and it maintained its principal place of business in Nashville,
Tennessee. The court stated that the joinder of HCAS&S would leave an alien corporation pres-
ent on both sides of this controversy, and that this alignment would preclude diversity jurisdic-
tion. On the other hand, should section 1332(c) apply to alien corporations, diversity jurisdiction
would survive as HCAS&S maintains its principal place of business in the state of Tennessee.
Id. at 871-72. The court, relying heavily on Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Services, Ltd.,
386 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and Southeast, ruled that section 1332(c) does apply to alien
corporations. 542 F. Supp at 879.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
55. Eisenberg, 189 F. Supp. at 502-03.
56. See S. REP., supra note 5, at 3100-01.
57. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 3601. Among the reasons cited for preferring
a federal forum are to escape the prejudices of local courts; the alleged superiority of the federal
courts; tactical considerations; the superiority of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and the
maintenance of a free flow of capital from one section of the country to another. Id.
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The Southeast and Blue Dot opinions deal with this problem by applying
section 1332(c) to alien corporations."8 These courts held that a corporation
should be considered to be a citizen of a state when its principal place of
business is located there. In the above hypothetical, no diversity jurisdiction
would exist because the corporation would be deemed a citizen of state A,
the location of its principal place of business. A controversy between citizens
of "different states" therefore would not exist as required by section
1332(a)(1).9
This interpretation has received a great deal of support. 61 Many commen-
tators concur with this interpretation, reasoning that it best complies with
the rationale underlying the creation of section 1332(c). 61 It may be argued
that if section 1332(c) is not applied to alien corporations, a situation will
arise equivalent to the undesirable scenario that the section was designed to
prevent. Assigning state citizenship to an alien corporation principally operating
in the United States would prevent it from suing in a federal court solely
because of its incorporation in another country. Furthermore, this interpreta-
tion is consonant with the basic purpose of the statute-the reduction of the
diversity jurisdiction case load of the federal courts. 62
While it is true that diversity jurisdiction is rejected in the above hypothetical,
supposedly reducing the federal court workload, this interpretation fails because
it creates diversity in certain other situations involving alien corporations. In
Bergen Shipping Co. v. Japan Marine Service, Ltd.," a situation factually
opposite to that of Southeast confronted the court. The suit was brought by
a Liberian corporation with its principal place of business in New York against
a Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in Japan. Under
the Eisenberg approach no federal diversity jurisdiction existed because both
parties were aliens."1 The Bergen court, however, relied on the Southeast ap-
proach in finding that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate. It held that the
plaintiff was a citizen of the state of New York, according to the language
of section 1332(a)(2), engaged in a controversy against a citizen of a foreign
state. 65 According to this view, diversity would be created under section
58. See supra text accompanying notes 35-49.
59. The corporation and its opposition would both be citizens of State A.
60. See generally, WRIGHr & MILLER, supra note 8, § 3628; MooRE, supra note 3, 0.75[3].
61. VRGHT & MnTI R, supra note 8, § 3628.
62. Id.
63. 386 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
64. The Bergen court stated that "[i]t is beyond dispute that this section [1332(a)] does
not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in suits between aliens." Id. at 432.
65. This analysis did, however, receive support in Richmond Constr. Corp. v. Hilb, 482
F. Supp. 1201 (M.D. Fla. 1980), where the court stated that this interpretation would seem to
be consistent with the overall purpose and intent of section 1332(c). That is, it would often reduce
the instances of diversity jurisdiction (although not in every situation) and eliminate the "unfair
advantage given the actually-local, but fictionally-foreign corporation." Id. at 1203, quoting S.
REP., supra note 5, at 3119-20. But see Hercules Inc. v. Dynamic Export Corp., 71 F.R.D.
101 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Hercules the court refused to invoke diversity jurisdiction where both
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1332(a)(1) when an alien corporation with its principal place of business in
state A sued or was sued by an alien corporation with its principal place of
business in state B because the controversy involved citizens of "different
states."
The court in Bergen recognized this dilemma and attempted to distinguish
between the "underlying purpose" of section 1332(c) and the "stated" pur-
pose of the statute. The court stated:
While we are cognizant that the application of the Southeast rule in the
present case would enlarge federal jurisdiction, rather than restricting it,
which was the underlying purpose of Section 1332(c), and the result of
the Southeast decision, it at least is not inconsistent with the stated pur-
pose of the statute, i.e., eliminating the "evil" of allowing purely local
controversies to be resolved in the federal courts. 6'
The Bergen decision has not been adopted uniformly. In Corporacion
Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales,67 the court held that the federal
district court lacked diversity jurisdiction in a suit involving two alien cor-
porations. One of the parties, a Swiss corporation, had its principal place
of business in New York and thereby claimed dual citizenship under section
1332(c). The court refused to consider the issue, holding that, even assuming
such dual citizenship, the fact that alien parties were present on both sides
would destroy complete diversity. 68
An alien corporation can be deemed to possess dual citizenship only in a
limited number of situations. This interpretation of section 1332(c) is consis-
tent with the intent of Congress in enacting subsection (c). It is also within
the constitutional strictures of article III which define the scope of controver-
sies that may be considered by federal courts. 9
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING SECTION 1332(c)
TO ALIEN CORPORATIONS
Congress may not create federal court jurisdiction beyond the limits
established by article III."' The Supreme Court has held that a "statute can-
parties were aliens, even though one of the aliens had its principal place of business in New
York. The court in Hercules argued that:
The statute [section 1332(c)] creates a principle of dual citizenship, not one of alter-
native citizenship. Thus, where a corporation is incorporated in state A and has
its principal place of business in state B and the adverse party is a citizen of either
A or B diversity is lacking .... Likewise, assuming arguendo that § 1332(c) is
applicable to alien corporations, when an alien corporation with its principal place
of business in state A is adverse to either an alien or a citizen of state A, diversity
would be lacking.
Id. at 107 (citations omitted).
66. Bergen, 386 F. Supp. at 434 (emphasis in original).
67. 477 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
68. Id. at 617-18.
69. Article III provides in pertinent part: "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Con-
troversies . . .between Citizens of different States ... and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
70. Id.
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not extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Constitution."' Arguably,
section 1332(c) exceeds those limits by creating dual citizenship for alien cor-
porations if that statute is interpreted, as it was in Bergen, to permit an alien
corporation whose principal place of business is located in the United States
to bring suit in federal court against another alien corporation.
Congress' ability to determine the jurisdictional limits of the federal judiciary
has been broadly interpreted. In Eldridge v. Richfield Oil Corp.,7  the con-
stitutionality of section 1332(c), as applied to domestic corporations, was
upheld. The court interpreted "citizen" when applied to corporations to be
something other than the citizenship afforded an individual. The Eldridge court
stated that "corporations are 'deemed' to be the equivalent of citizens for
the purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction." 73 Congress, according to the
Eldridge analysis, has the authority to expand as well as limit jurisdiction.7 4
This conferral of a "special" citizenship has been the basis of commen-
tators' arguments7 that section 1332(c) is constitutional when applied to alien
corporations as well. If Congress has the power to change the status of an
entity for diversity purposes, 76 and if a corporation is deemed to be a citizen, 7
then no reason exists, under this analysis, for the jurisdiction statute to be
inapplicable to alien corporations. 7 1
Congress does possess the authority to expand jurisdiction. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has said, "pleas for extension of the diversity jurisdiction to
hitherto uncovered broad categories of litigants ought to be made to Con-
gress and not to the courts."'" But Congress, as previously discussed, may
not extend jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Constitution."
Article III recognizes that federal court jurisdiction includes disputes be-
tween a citizen of a state and a subject of a foreign state."' To deem an alien
corporation to be a citizen of the state of its principal place of business and
to allow it to bring suit in a federal forum is clearly recognized by the Con-
stitution. This ability does not, however, extend to that same alien corpora-
tion bringing suit against another corporation chartered by a foreign country;
only "national" citizens have the ability to bring a suit in a United States
court. To interpret section 1332(c) as allowing a suit between two aliens ex-
ceeds the language of the Constitution. The application of section 1332(c)
71. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). See generally WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 8, § 3521.
72. 247 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Cal. 1965), aff'd 364 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1020 (1967).
73. 247 F. Supp. at 409.
74. Id. at 410. See also United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
75. E.g., WIrr & MILER, supra note 8, § 3628.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Bouligny, 382 U.S. at 150-51.
80. See supra note 71.
81. See supra note 69.
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to the alien corporation in this situation results in the creation of a form
of triple citizenship: United States citizenship in order to gain access to the
federal court;8" state citizenship to determine whether there is diversity; and
the foreign citizenship already held by the entity. This application also has
the result of expanding the workload of the federal court system, the very
thing that Congress attempted to reduce by enacting subsection (c).
Defining citizenship flexibly is a reasonable exercise of congressional authori-
ty. Congress has recognized the relationship between a corporation, regardless
of its place of incorporation, and its base of business operations. To confer
a form of state citizenship on an alien corporation is no more unreasonable
than the suggestion that Congress could require domestic incorporation as
a condition precedent to operating its principal place of business in this
country.83 Citizenship should never be so liberally interpreted, however, that
it confers a form of national citizenship on an alien corporation.
IV. A NARRow INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1332(c)
Section 1332(c) should not be broadly applied to alien corporations. A
restrictive approach such as the one employed by the Eisenberg court,
however," is equally unacceptable. The statute instead should be construed
as conferring dual citizenship on an alien corporation only when it maintains
its principal place of business in the United States. The statute should never
be read as conferring national citizenship on that entity.
This approach concurs with the goals of Congress in enacting section
1332(c).1s One result would be the reduction of the federal courts' workload
because the number of situations eligible for diversity jurisdiction would
necessarily remain limited. Furthermore, a corporation maintaining its prin-
82. WMIGHT & MILER, supra note 8, § 3628.
83. The American Law Institute has suggested that the wording of section 1332(c) be changed
so that a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of "every State and foreign state by which it
has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business."
The ALI stated:
The Reporters do not believe that this constitutional question is a substantial one.
The corporate fiction does not appear to rest on any basis that should foreclose
the clearly reasonable conclusion that a corporation can be treated as having
American state citizenship if it is incorporated in a foreign country but has its prin-
cipal place of business in the United States. This would certainly seem true where
the shareholders are United States citizens but should apply more generally as well.
If nothing else, it would seem difficult to maintain such a Constitutional barrier
in circumstances such as these where Congress could undoubtedly require domestic
incorporation as a condition of having a principal place of business in the United
States.
AMERIcAN LAW INsTnrTT, STuDY oF DMvSION OF THE JURISDICTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CouRTs § 1301(b)(I) (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI].
84. See supra note 19.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
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cipal business operations in the United States would be precluded from hiding
behind the legal fiction of a foreign charter for purposes of litigation.8 6
A Liberian-chartered corporation, for example, could not avail itself of a
federal forum solely because of its status as an alien corporation.87 In order
to bring suit in federal court, this corporation, headquartered in state A, would
be required to demonstrate that the other party to the litigation was not a
citizen of that state. This hypothetical recognizes that a corporation, as an
employer and a member of the community, may benefit from local prejudices,
a fact that is not altered by its legal incorporation in a foreign country. Deem-
ing an alien corporation to be a citizen of its state of principal business ac-
tivities also prevents the corporation from successfully manipulating the legal
system as was done in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,89 the catalyst for the passage of section
1332(c).9° The minimization of the federal courts' workload must always be
the crucial factor in applying section 1332(a) to a particular fact situation.
Following this interpretation, if an alien corporation with its principal place
of business in state A sues or is sued by a citizen of state A, no diversity
jurisdiction would exist.9 1 Section 1332(c) would apply to the alien corpora-
tion because it is deemed to be a citizen of state A. 91 In a second hypothetical,
no jurisdiction would exist when a foreign corporation with its principal place
of business in state A is involved in a controversy with an alien corporation,
foreign state, or citizen. Diversity would be lacking because, following this
Note's interpretation, section 1332(a) requires that a United States citizen be
involved on at least one side of the controversy. The alien corporation would
be considered a citizen of state A but would not have the requisite national
citizenship" necessary to bring a suit against another alien corporation in a
federal court.
The application of section 1332(c) to an alien corporation in the first
hypothetical is similar to its application to a domestic corporation. It prevents
86. See Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court
Fiction Revised, 77 HAgv. L. REv. 1426, 1427-30 (1964). See also Southeast Guar. Trust Co.
v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. IUl. 1973).
87. Chemical Transp. Corp. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
88. See Moore & Weckstein, supra note 86. The authors argue that the Founders' fears
that an alien corporation would suffer the effects of the prejudice of local courts and legislatures
is unfounded today. Id. at 1449.
89. 276 U.S. 518 (1927).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
91. "State" here means state of the United States.
92. It would not be a controversy between citizens of "different States" as required by
section 1332(a)(1), nor would it fall within 1332(a)(2) or 1332(a)(3).
93. But see WRioHT & MruR, supra note 8, § 3628:
Congress clearly has the power to change the states of corporations for purposes
of diversity .... Thus there seems to be no reason why the jurisdiction statute
cannot be applied to foreign corporations .... [W]hen the dispute between an
alien and a foreign corporation with a principal place of business in the United
States arises out of local activities, a federal court should be available.
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a truly local corporation from invoking diversity jurisdiction by virtue of its
foreign charter. Furthermore, it limits the application of diversity jurisdic-
tion. Such an application therefore would be consistent with the enactment
of section 1332(c)."' There is no constitutional issue because the interpreta-
tion does not expand the reach of federal judicial power beyond the constitu-
tional limitations of article III.
The second hypothetical is more difficult because the result is seemingly
inequitable. Section 1332(c) is applied to alien corporations in the first
hypothetical but denied in the second. The rationale for not applying section
1332(c) to alien corporations when it creates diversity jurisdiction is that sec-
tion 1332(c) defines state citizenship only; it does not confer United States
national citizenship on that corporate entity. Diversity jurisdiction may be
involved only in those situations where a United States citizen is a party to
the action. A foreign-chartered corporation necessarily fails under this
interpretation.
It is not sufficient to maintain that state citizenship is the sole requisite
for invoking diversity jurisdiction. Nor should much deference be given to
the argument that access to the federal courts should always be granted to
a foreign-chartered corporation merely because it maintains its principal place
of business headquarters in the United States. If such a corporation is con-
cerned with gaining access to a federal forum, that corporation could easily
re-incorporate in the United States and thereby receive the protection of the
American courts."
A more troublesome situation occurs when an alien corporation, with its
principal place of business in state A, sues or is sued by an alien-chartered
corporation whose principal place of business is located in state B. Section
1332(a)(1) may apply if the situation is interpreted as a controversy between
"citizens of different States." Again it seems that if section 1332 is considered
as a whole, then implicitly one of the parties must be a United States citizen.
The corporations in this hypothetical may be defined as state citizens, but
it is unreasonable to deem them to be national citizens. Until Congress amends
section 1332, it is unreasonable to give the statute any broader meaning than
the one suggested by this Note.
Commentators96 have argued that section 1332(c) should apply to alien cor-
porations without limitation because there "seems to be no reason why the
94. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
95. ALl, supra note 83, at 113 n.14.
96. E.g., WRIGHT & MLLER, supra note 8, § 3628. The ALI uses a similar argument in
asserting that the constitutional issue involved is not a substantial one. ALI, supra note 83, at
113 n.14. The Reporter states that "[i]f nothing else, it would seem difficult to maintain such
as constitutional barrier in circumstances such as these where Congress could undoubtedly re-
quire domestic incorporation as a condition of having a principal place of business in the United
States." Id.
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jurisdiction statute cannot be applied to foreign corporations. ' 97 The argu-
ment, however, fails to address the issue of the expansion of diversity jurisdic-
tion, which is the necessary result of applying section 1332(c) in this manner.
Proponents assert that there may be affirmative reasons why Congress should
provide a federal forum when a foreign corporation sues or is sued by an
alien.9 8 However, it is questionable whether Congress has the constitutional
power to provide a federal forum in such a case. Moreover, Congress did
not articulate any of these "affirmative reasons" when enacting section
1332(c). 99
V. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Various proposals have been recommended to expand the language of sec-
tion 1332(c)' 0 by creating dual citizenship for alien corporations. The American
Law Institute (ALI) has proposed that dual citizenship be created"0 ' for a
foreign-chartered corporation so that the corporation would be a citizen of
its foreign state of incorporation as well as a citizen of the state or foreign
state where its principal place of business is located. The ALI proposal would
also deem a corporation to be a citizen of every state in which it is incor-
porated. Such an amendment, it is argued, would help to avoid "any possible
appearance of injustice or tenable ground for resentment." ' 2 The alien cor-
poratioin would have the assurance that it was being afforded the same judicial
protections guaranteed to similar domestic corporations.
1 0 3
Amending section 1332(c) in this manner would clearly confer access to
the federal courts upon alien corporations. As discussed previously,' 4 the con-
stitutionality of such an amendment is questionable. Such an amendment could
be interpreted as allowing an alien corporation to bring suit against another
alien corporation in federal court. Diversity juirisdiction would then be ex-
panded and the workload of the federal courts increased-the very problem
that Congress attempted to resolve by enacting section 1332(c).1los The pro-
ponents of the amendment fail to address this issue in a forthright manner.
The ability of two alien corporations to bring suit in federal court should
always be precluded. Allowing such suits results in a further burden on the
97. WRIGr & MILLER, supra note 8, § 3628.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 5.
100. WRiGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 3628; ALI, supra note 83, at 113-14.
101. The proposed amendment reads: "A corporation shall be deemed a citizen of every
State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign states
where it has its principal place of business." ALI, supra note 83, at 110.
102. Id. at 108.
103. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 74-82.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
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federal courts' workload. In light of the increase in international commercial
trade and the growing number of foreign corporations locating plants and
offices in the United States, it would be contrary to the goals of section 1332(c)
to allow these corporations access to the federal courts on the grounds of
diversity of citizenship. Amending section 1332(c) in this manner would be
detrimental to the federal judicial system.
CONCLUSION
The unique problems that arise when section 1332(c) is applied to alien cor-
porations are created because of the confusion regarding a definition of cor-
porate citizenship. There does not seem to be a truly consistent application
of section 1332(c) to alien corporations. This Note supports the application
of the statute only when a United States citizen is on one side of the con-
troversy. This interpretation limits the use of diversity jurisdiction and,
moreover, it prohibits a purely local, but fictionally alien, corporation from
gaining access to the federal courts. It also avoids potential constitutional
problems.
There is no easy solution to this problem. Perhaps the answer lies in a
redefinition of corporate citizenship, possibly by looking to the citizenship
of directors or majority stockholders. This issue should be addressed by Con-
gress with a view towards the increase in multinational corporations and the
growth in the world economy. Absent congressional action, however, it is
unreasonable to give section 1332(c) a broader meaning than that offered by
this Note.
Jim WHITLATCH
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